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Nervous System Architecture
Staff College Graduates and the Formation
of Regular, Territorial Force, New Army, and
Dominion Divisions, 1914-1916
BRENDAN HO GAN
Abstract : The historiography of the First World War lacks an assessment
of the role that trained staff officers had during the expansion of the
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) between 1914 and 1918. This article
aims to determine what role staff college graduates played in the early
expansion of the BEF. The central conclusion of this article is that stafftrained officers were critical in the expansion of the BEF during the
war. They occupied all the key command and staff appointments in the
British regular army, the Territorial Force, New Army, and Dominion
divisions, both when those formations were formed and when they first
went into action. The armies of the empire could neither have expanded
nor functioned without them.

I

of 21 March 1919, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas
Haig, Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the British Expeditionary
Force (BEF) wrote:
n his final dispatch

The Staff Colleges had only produced a reserve of Staff officers adequate
to the needs of our Army on a peace footing, and for the mobilisation of
the Expeditionary Force of six divisions. Consequently, on the expansion
of the Army during the war[,] many officers had to be recruited for Staff
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appointments—from good regular officers chiefly, but also from officers
of our new Armies—and trained for the new duties required of them.1

Haig, like any modern general, needed trained staff officers for
his army. On the battlefields of the early-twentieth century, one
man could no longer plan the operations of an army, manage its
logistics and movements, and command it in battle. Staff officers
were necessary to plan, prepare, coordinate, and conduct operations.
Functioning as the “nervous system” of their formations, staff officers
fulfilled these duties, which, in turn, enabled commanders to lead
their formations.2 Haig understood that. But how did the War Office
use the limited cadre of staff-trained officers to which he referred in
the despatch cited above for a tenfold expansion of the armies to
a force of two-million men that included divisions from the British
regular army, the Territorial Force, the New Army, the Dominion
armies, and India?3
Staff college graduates held the most important command and
staff appointments in these divisions, both when they were formed
and when they first went into action, and were, therefore, critical
in the expansion of the British Empire armies and their battlefield
performance. By filling the majority of these appointments, the staff
1  
J.H. Boraston (ed.), Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches, December 1915-April 1919
(London and Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1919), 344.
2  
The nervous system analogy is from Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War
(New York: Methuen, 1981), 24.
3  
British regular army comprised soldiers stationed at home and in imperial garrisons.
Professional and small in comparison to the conscript armies of the continental
powers, the British army had a strength of 247,000 officers and soldiers in July 1914.
Charged with defence of the Home Isles, the Territorial Force had been created
by Secretary of State for War Richard Haldane in April 1908 after he rationalized
Britain’s militia, yeomanry, and volunteer units. Haldane envisioned his force of
part-time soldiers as the basis for supporting and expanding the army during war
without resorting to conscription. The Territorials had an establishment of 267,000
men in July 1914. Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener ordered the formation
of the New Armies in August 1914 to meet the anticipated manpower requirements
for the war. Volunteers enlisted in the New Army for the duration of the war. The
Dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa all maintained small
forces of varying strengths that could be expanded and plugged into the larger BEF
with only minor reorganization and training. That this was possible owed greatly
to pre-war staff training and efforts to standardize organizational structure. The
British Indian Army had a further 240,000 men that could be used both to defend
India or incorporated into an overseas expeditionary force. Bruce Gudmundsson,
“The Expansion of the British Army during World War I,” in Matthias Strohn (ed.),
World War I Companion (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013), 47-60.
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officer cadre of 1914 were the nervous system architecture for the
building of new formations in the BEF, allowing it to expand from
six divisions in 1914 to sixty-plus divisions by 1918. They also helped
train a pool of capable staff officers, either through on-the-job training
with the staff learner system or as instructors on wartime staff
courses. Moreover, many staff college graduates eventually moved
on to command or staff appointments above the divisional level. Not
all of these officers rose to the occasion, but clearly, the BEF could
not have expanded in the way that it did were it not for the pre-war
staff-trained officers, who helped form the central nodes of the staff
nervous system and grow extra nerves to extend the system to the
newest limbs of the army.
There are a few studies of pre-war staff training, histories of
national armies and their wartime expansion, and some initial
enquiry into divisional commanders and staffs during the First World
War.4 However, there is presently no literature that examines how
the limited pool of pre-war-trained staff officers were used to fill the
key command and staff appointments in the rapidly expanding BEF
from a cross-national, or imperial, perspective. This article seeks to
fill at least part of that gap in the historiography of the BEF and
the First World War. It does so by looking at what roles staff college
graduates played in the expansion of the BEF, examining what they
were trained to do, how many were available to do it, how they were
employed in war, and how well they performed on the battlefield.
A sample of seventeen regular, Territorial Force, New Army, and
Dominion divisions—approximately thirty per cent of the total
4  
Included amongst these are: Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff
College, 1854-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972); A.R. Godwin-Austen, The Staff
and the Staff College (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1927); Douglas E.
Delaney, The Imperial Army Project: Britain and the Land Forces of the Dominions
and India, 1902-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); George Morton-Jack,
The Indian Army on the Western Front: India’s Expeditionary Force to France
and Belgium in the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014); Peter Simkins, Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 19141916 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2007); Douglas E. Delaney, “Mentoring the
Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 19141918,” The Journal of Military History 77, 3 (July 2013): 931-953; Paul Martin
Harris, The Men Who Planned the War: A Study of the Staff of the British Army
on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (London and New York: Routledge, 2013); Simon
Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18: Defeat into Victory
(London and New York: Routledge, 2005); and Andy Simpson, Directing Operations:
British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-18 (Stroud: Spellmount, 2006).
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Sir Douglas Haig talking to General Currie. February, 1918. [Library and Archives Canada PA-

002605]

number of divisions in the BEF in November 1918—will be studied.5
These divisions were selected because they were raised at different
points in the war and had varying records of battlefield performance,
all of which allow a reasonable determination of what roles stafftrained officers played in different armies and at different times.
Staff officers were made in staff colleges. In the British Empire
armies, Camberley and Quetta were the principal institutions
responsible for the professional military education of regular officers
after their commissioning. Before the First World War, much effort

The divisions selected for this study are: for the regular army, the 2nd, 6th, 7th,
and 8th Divisions; for the New Army, the 12th (Eastern), 15th (Scottish), 23rd,
and 35th Divisions; for the Territorial Force, the 47th (2nd London), 56th (1st
London), 60th (2nd/2nd London), and 62nd (2nd West Riding) Divisions; and for
the Dominion armies, the 1st Canadian, 2nd Canadian, New Zealand, 1st Australian,
and 5th Australian Divisions. Notably excluded are the Indian army and Union
Defence Forces of South Africa. The Indian army contributed most heavily to the
campaigns in the Middle East, with only two infantry divisions employed on the
Western Front for twelve months in 1914-1915, and with very few psc-trained officers
in key appointments. The South Africans only fielded a brigade in Europe, their
primary contributions of the war being the campaigns against German colonies in
Africa.
5  
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and thought went into improving the armies of the empire and
making them more compatible. Post-South African War (1899-1902)
army reforms and agreements to organize the British, Indian, and
Dominion armies along the same lines resulted in efforts to school
staff officers from across the empire at the imperial staff colleges
of Camberley and Quetta, where candidates undertook an intense
two-year curriculum, based on the Field Service Regulations.6
Officers who graduated—earning the coveted post nominals psc
(passed staff college)—learned how to assist their commanders in
planning operations, preparing orders, and coordinating the efforts
of multiple units and formations.7 By 1914, there were 1,004 staff
college graduates in the army, including officers of the Indian and
Dominion armies.8 The London School of Economics (LSE) offered
a six-month course to train selected officers on administrative staff
duties.9 Some 241 officers completed the LSE course between 1907
and 1914, 197 of whom were still serving in 1914.10 There were also
another sixty-eight officers who were qualified for staff employment
as a result of “service in the field,” plus another 164 still on course at
Camberley and Quetta.11 In total, therefore, there were 1,433 officers
available for staff duties by the end of 1914. Still this was insufficient
for meeting the requirements of an expanded army for continental
warfare, as Haig alluded above.

6  
War Office, Field Service Regulations—Part I: Operations, 1909 (London: His
Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO), 1912); and Field Service Regulations—Part II:
Organization and Administration, 1909 (London: HMSO, 1914).
7  
For an assessment of the training offered by the staff colleges, see Harris, The Men
Who Planned the War¸ 24-34.
8  
Brian Bond claims that the British army only had 447 staff college graduates
available for service when war broke out in August 1914. This claim has been
propagated by historians in numerous other studies of staffs during the war. However,
a re-examination of The Monthly Army List for August 1914 suggests that the figure
of 447 is incorrect. There were 1,004 serving psc officers, sixty-nine officers qualified
for staff employment due to their service on the staff in the field, 103 students
at Camberley, fifty-one students at Quetta, and 234 officers qualified in a course
of instruction at LSE. This much larger number of trained staff officers than the
frequently cited figure of 447 although still unable to fill all of the key command and
staff appointments of a sixty-division BEF. Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff
College, 324; War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914 (Uckfield: Naval
& Military Press Ltd., 2013), 2523-62.
9  
Aimée Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British
Army, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 170-72.
10  
War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2571-76.
11  
Ibid., 2567-70, 2480-81.
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Not all pscs were competent, yet history has unfairly tarnished their
reputation. In the popular imagination, they are incompetent Captain
Darlings, or stuffy, out-of-touch aristocrats.12 Many staff officers were
not well liked, and the frontline soldiers sometimes referred to the staff
officers as the “bloody red tabs” and blamed them for their misery in
the trenches and heavy casualties during seemingly-futile offensives.13
More serious accusations by historians denigrate the staff officers
for their lack of experience, inherent conservatism, and inability to
innovate or accept new technologies.14 These criticisms seem especially
strong in some Australian and Canadian literature, where British
staff officers are held in some contempt or largely forgotten.15 Worse
yet, some historians have credited the successes of BEF formations,
particularly those of the Dominions, to the pluck and supposedly nonconventional approaches of the non-regulars.16 This perception is not
borne out by the following examination of selected regular, New Army,
Territorial Force and Dominion divisions. Indeed, as much as some
Canadians and Australians disliked the British professional soldier,
they depended on them, especially in the earlier periods of the war.
In the staff system used by all the British Empire divisions, staff
work was divided between the general “G” staff, adjutant-general
“A” staff, and quartermaster-general “Q” staff branches. The general
officer commanding (GOC) of a division had in his headquarters:
three “G” staff officers—the general staff officer first grade (GSO 1),
general staff officer second grade (GSO 2), and general staff officer

Captain Darling is a character in the 1980s television series Blackadder Goes
Forth.
13  
Desmond Morton, When Your Number’s Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First
World War (Toronto: Vintage Books, 1993), 113.
14  
Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front & the
Emergence of Modern War, 1900-1918 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987); and Martin
Samuels, Command or Control?: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and
German Armies, 1888-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 1995).
15  
For instance, the Canadian Official History makes only passing reference to the
role played by British officers in the CEF. G.W.L. Nicholson, Official History of the
Canadian Army in the First World War: Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1964), 114-15, 127, 250, 410,
415, 441, 539-43.
16  
Proponents of the Dominion “supersoldiers” myth include historians Pierre Berton
and Ted Barris. Pierre Berton, Vimy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986);
Marching to War: Canada’s Turbulent Years, 1899-1953 (Toronto: Anchor Canada,
2001), 125-224; and Ted Barris, Victory at Vimy: Canada Comes of Age, April 9-12
1917 (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 2007).
12  
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third grade (GSO 3)—to manage operations and intelligence, as well
as an “A” and “Q” staff—the assistant adjutant and quartermaster
general (AA & QMG), deputy assistant adjutant and quartermaster
general (DAA & QMG), and deputy assistant quartermaster
general (DAQMG)—to handle the administrative and logistical
requirements.17 His three brigade commanders had brigade majors
(BM) to manage all of the staff work for the infantry brigades, as
did the commander Royal Artillery (CRA) to control the divisional
artillery. In each case, staff officers worked with their counterparts
in higher, flanking, and lower headquarters to keep abreast of issues,
future plans, and operations.
Competent staff officers supported their commanders and were
the nervous system architecture that helped generate new formations.
As the relationship of Major-General E.W.B. Morrison, commander
of the Canadian Corps artillery, and Major Alan F. Brooke, the corps
staff officer Royal Artillery, illustrates, experienced staff officers
often made up for their commanders’ lack of experience, technical
knowledge, or competence.18 Brooke makes it clear in his memoirs
that he, not Morrison, was the brains behind the Canadian Corps
artillery writing “I virtually had a free hand in control of the whole
of the artillery of the corps.”19 Without competent staff officers,
things could go horribly wrong. Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick
Stanley Maude, commander of British forces in Mesopotamia and the
capturer of Bagdad in March 1917, noted a month after the disaster
at Kut-al-Amara (7 December 1915–29 April 1916), “Staff work has
been a shortcoming throughout this war. Our number of trained Staff
Officers was even at first scarcely adequate, but now, with our large
army, it is dreadful.... It is one of the chief points towards which we

Canadian divisions normally had two GSO 2s and two GSO 3s. Usually, one
of the GSO 2s and one of the GSO 3s was an experienced British officer who was
responsible for mentoring his Dominion counterpart in staff duties. Harris, The Men
Who Planned the War, 126-27.
18  
Later Field-Marshal Alan Francis Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke of
Brookeborough. Alanbrooke served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff during the
Second World War.
19  
Field-Marshal Alan Francis Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke of Brookeborough,
“Notes on my life,” 1954, Papers of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke (Alanbrooke
Papers), 5/2/13, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), King’s College
London, 59.
17  
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shall have to turn our attention at the end of the war, this training
of the Staff.”20
Not all command and staff positions were equally important.
For the purposes of analysis and explanation, the various divisional
command and staff appointments have been divided into three tiers.
The GOC, GSO 1, AA & QMG, and the brigade commanders were
all first-tier command and staff appointments. Invariably, these were
the first positions filled when a new division formed. Generally, psctrained officers occupied these positions in the regular, Territorial,
New Army, and Dominion divisions throughout most of the war.
These command and staff appointments were the nuclei for the
creation of newly-formed divisions because they could mentor their
subordinate commanders and staff officers. Dispersing psc-trained
officers across the BEF helped to ensure a general level of competence
and ability across all divisions. The second-tier command and staff
appointments included the GSO 2, GSO 3, DAA & QMG, DAQMG,
CRA, and the BMs.21 Initially, when the regular and first Dominion
divisions formed, psc-trained officers held most of these appointments.
However, as the armies expanded and the war progressed, the BEF
increasingly formalized its system of staff officer training to fill these
second-tier appointments. The mentoring system evolved into the
formalized staff learner programme and the wartime staff colleges at
Hesdin and Cambridge that produced many excellent staff officers,
principally from the regular army but also from the Territorial Force,
New Armies, and the Dominions.22 The third-tier of staff appointments
included everyone else serving on the divisional staff. However, staff
training was not critical for third-tier appointments and so will not
be included for the purposes of this study.
Staff-trained officers played a critical role in the expansion of
the BEF. When the Territorial Force, New Army, and Dominion
divisions formed, they encountered numerous problems that trained

Quoted in Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College, 268.
Although the engineers played an important role in mining operations and
the construction of defensive works and infrastructure, the commander of Royal
Engineers and his adjutant are not included in this examination of divisional staffs
since only forty-six serving RE officers successfully completed staff college before
August 1914. War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2533-76.
22  
The staff learner programme and wartime staff colleges are briefly examined in
Delaney, The Imperial Army Project, 126-28; and Harris, The Men Who Planned
the War, 97-122.
20  
21  
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staff officers and other professionals were instrumental in solving.
Their soldiers needed to learn how to fight, their officers needed to
learn how to command, and perhaps most importantly, their staffs
needed to learn how to plan, coordinate, and manage divisional
operations. But trained staff officers were scarce, a state of affairs
made worse by the shortsighted decision to close the staff colleges in
1914.23 These 1,443 officers filled the majority of the high command
and senior staff appointments in the BEF and, as historian Simon
Robbins has argued, formed the “back bone of the BEF in the war
years and enabled the war to be fought.”24 Apportioning them was
a complicated affair, however. Despite the shortage of trained staff
officers in the BEF, many psc officers, believing the war would be
a short one, sought out regimental command appointments instead
of serving on a staff. Consequently, a significant percentage of psctrained officers were wasted in the first six-to-twelve months of the
war as they performed regimental duties, instead of serving on a
staff where their training could have been put to better use.25 It
should also be noted that The Monthly Army List for August 1914
included staff-qualified officers like Lieutenant-Generals Sir Douglas
Haig and Sir Ian Hamilton, and Major-Generals Sir Henry Rawlinson
and Julian Byng—all of whom held senior command appointments
and were not available for staff employment. Some psc-qualified
officers also served in other campaigns, such as those in Palestine
and Mesopotamia.
The impending shortage of staff-trained officers caused by
the expansion of the BEF was not immediately apparent in 1914.
Amongst the regular divisions, the percentage of command and
staff appointments held by staff-trained officers was extremely high.
When the 2nd Division first went into action during the Battle of
Mons (23 August 1914), psc-trained officers held eleven of the fifteen

The War Office had assumed that the conflict would be short; and, upon the
outbreak of war, students at the staff college received orders to take up their
appointments in the BEF. Since there was no need to train more officers for a short
war, the staff colleges closed indefinitely, and the instructors also received orders to
fill command and staff appointments in the BEF. Bond, The Victorian Army and the
Staff College, 294-95, 303; and Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College, 262.
24  
Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18, 40-41.
25  
Ibid., 37; and John Hussey, “The Deaths of Qualified Staff Officers in the Great
War: ‘A Generation Missing?,’” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research
75, 304 (Winter 1997): 246-259.
23  

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019

9

Canadian Military History, Vol. 28 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 2
10

Nervous System Architecture

key divisional command and staff positions.26 In addition, the AA
& QMG, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Conway-Gordon had completed the
administrative course offered at LSE, so, in total, trained staff officers
actually held twelve of the fifteen key appointments.27 Similarly, when
the 6th Division mobilized in August, psc-trained officers held eleven
of the fifteen key divisional command and staff positions.28 The
commander of the 16th Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General E.C.
Ingouville-Williams, had qualified for staff employment due to his
service on the staff in the field before the First World War, and the
DAQMG, Major A. Delavoye, had completed the course at LSE.29 So,
much like the 2nd Division, in the 6th Division trained staff officers
War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-2562; and Everard
Wyrall, The History of the Second Division, 1914-1918 (London, Edinburg, and New
York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1921), 328-31.
27  
War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2571.
28  
Ibid., 2523-62; and T.O. Marden, A Short History of the Sixth Division, Aug.
1914-March 1919 (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1920), 109-20.
29  
War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2568, 2571.
26  
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actually held thirteen of the fifteen key appointments. Clearly, the
premium the army placed on staff-trained officers is reflected by
the high percentage of command and staff appointments that these
officers held.
Even amongst the divisions that were formed by repatriating
regular troops from imperial garrisons, the percentage of stafftrained officers filling the key divisional command and staff positions
remained high. In October 1914, when the 7th Division first went
into action at Antwerp, psc-trained officers held ten of the fifteen key
divisional command and staff positions.30 Although the number of
staff-trained officers assigned to the 7th Division was lower than the
formed regular divisions, it was higher, or at least comparable, to the
number of staff-trained officers assigned to New Army and Territorial
Force divisions that formed at the same time. In November, when
the 8th Division fought at Ypres, psc-trained officers held twelve of
the fifteen key divisional command and staff positions.31 The CRA,
Brigadier-General A.E.A. Holland, although not psc, had qualified
for staff employment due to his pre-war staff experience, bringing
the total of staff-trained officers holding key appointments in the 8th
Division to thirteen.32
Many of these staff officers had served on staffs at the War Office,
Aldershot Command, and in headquarters of imperial garrisons across
the empire before the war. For instance, Major-General T. Capper,
GOC of the 7th Division, had held the appointments of inspector of
infantry, commandant Quetta, and commander of the 13th Infantry
Brigade.33 Capper’s counterpart in the 8th Division, Major-General
F.J. Davies, had served as the director of staff duties at the War
Office before the war.34 Some officers continued in appointments that
they had held before the war. For example, Captain G.M. James,
BM of the 22nd Infantry Brigade, had served as BM of the Pretoria
garrison before the war, which is where the units that composed

Ibid., 2523-62; and C.T. Atkinson, The Seventh Division, 1914-1918 (London:
John Murray, 1927), 505-13.
31  
War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-2562; and J.H. Boraston
and Cyril E.O. Bax, The Eighth Division in War, 1914-1918 (London: The Medici
Society Limited, 1926), 286.
32  
Ibid., 2568.
33  
Atkinson, The Seventh Division, 3.
34  
Boraston and Bax, The Eighth Division in War, 1.
30  
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the 22nd Brigade had been drawn.35 These instances of familiarity
between commanders and their staffs enhanced the cohesion and
corporate spirit of the division—no small feat for a division assembled
from numerous colonial garrisons.36
During the battles of 1914, trained staffs proved their worth
immediately during the rapid mobilization of the BEF and its
operations against the German army. After disembarking in France,
the staff of the 2nd Division coordinated its assembly and planned
its advance. Although the division only covered the right flank of
the BEF at Mons, and thus was spared the worst of the battle,
the divisional staff managed the rearguard actions that the division
fought as the BEF retreated.37 Fewer operations of war are more
difficult than a withdrawal in contact with the enemy. The staff
of the 6th Division directed a similarly-quick disembarkation and
concentration.38 Their excellent staff work enabled the division to
reinforce, in a timely manner, the hard-pressed BEF during the
Battle of the Aisne on 19 September 1914, just before the BEF
moved north into Flanders.39 The staff of the 8th Division managed
its disembarkation and immediately directed some of the division’s
units into action around Ypres.40 Inspired by wooden tramways used
for agricultural purposes on farms around his home, the division’s
AA & QMG decided to use a wooden tramway to supply troops in
the line.41 Eventually, these light rails became essential for supplying
the troops in the frontlines and feeding the guns with enormous
quantities of shells. Still, good staff work could not guarantee success
in the same way that poor staff planning could guarantee failure.
The division’s first major attack on the Moated Grange at Neuve
Chapelle, on 18 December, was a costly affair.42 Inadequate time for
planning and preparations resulted in heavy causalities and a failure
to hold captured ground.43 After the 7th Division disembarked on
6 October 1914, its commanders and staff had little time to plan

Atkinson, The Seventh Division, 4.
Ibid.
37  
Wyrall, The History of the Second Division, 19-52.
38  
Marden, A Short History of the Sixth Division, 1.
39  
Ibid., 3-5.
40  
Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions Part 1, 94.
41  
Boraston and Bax, The Eighth Division in War, 8.
42  
Ibid., 9-13.
43  
Ibid., 8.
35  
36  
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operations to support the Belgian troops defending Antwerp.44 By the
time the division arrived, the Germans had already captured most
of the city. The divisional staff planned and successfully executed a
number of blocking operations—another withdrawal in contact—to
cover the rearward movement of the Belgian army.45 Following the
Belgian withdrawal, the staff planned the division’s own withdrawal
to Ypres, where it linked up with the other divisions of the BEF on 14
October, and managed its operations in the battle to defend the city.46
Few things went according to plan for the BEF, but war on this
scale and intensity was new to everyone, including the Germans and
the French. Despite a decade of staff planning, the German Schlieffen
Plan fell far short of the encirclement battle that it was supposed
to produce, and the eighteen months that the French staff spent
tweaking Plan XVII before 1914 very nearly led the French armies to
disaster. Yet, several historians have singled the British staff out for
incompetence. In his critical biography of Haig, Denis Winter writes
that that BEF was “supported by staff work of low quality.”47 Robin
Prior and Trevor Wilson offer a similar critique of British staff work
prior to the first day of battle on the Somme (1 July-18 November
1916): “A more inappropriate way to initiate a great campaign would
be difficult to imagine.”48 However, these critics ignore the reality
that faced the staffs of the BEF. The organization was expanding
rapidly and trained staff officers were overwhelmed mentoring their
untrained subordinates in staff duties while themselves learning
how to fight on the Western Front. After the Battle of Loos (25-28
September 1915), Liberal peer Viscount Haldane perceptively noted:
When we are comparing our Army with Armies that have had a
General Staff for a hundred years or more, as is the case with the
German Army, no doubt we have been at a disadvantage, and no doubt
our disadvantage has been the greater because we have had to expand

Atkinson, The Seventh Division, 8.
Ibid.
46  
Ibid., 19-56.
47  
Denis Winter, Haig’s Command: A Reassessment (London: Viking, 1991), 140,
150.
48  
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, The Somme (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 2005), 92.
44  
45  
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our Army in France to something like five times the size at which it
started.49

These circumstances considered, the pscs conducted themselves well.
At least there was a corps of staff officers that could communicate
whatever developed and communicate military solutions in a manner
that all the components of the BEF understood. No action, right or
wrong would have been possible without them.
The staffs directed the formations of the BEF and kept them
together during the most difficult and dangerous operation of war:
a withdrawal in close contact with the enemy. Besides directing the
operations of the BEF, staffs managed its logistics. They ensured that
the troops had ammunition, a significant accomplishment considering
the amount of shells expended by the guns and bullets fired by
magazine-fed rifles and machine guns. The shortages of ammunition
that plagued later operations, like Neuve Chapelle (10-13 March
1915) or Aubers Ridge (9 May 1915), cannot be blamed on the staffs.
They effectively managed the use of the materiel that the BEF had
at its disposal. No British soldier was without bullets at any point
during the early battles of 1914, not even during the most frenzied
hours and days of the retreat from Mons. In addition, selected officers
of these staffs subsequently returned to Britain, where they played
an instrumental role in the formation of New Army and Territorial
Force divisions.
After the British government authorized the deployment of the
BEF to France in August 1914, additional reserves of manpower
had to be found. Upon Lord Kitchener’s appointment as Secretary
of State for War on 5 August, he issued his call to arms for 100,000
volunteers to serve overseas.50 Kitchener predicted a three-year war
and anticipated the need for at least a further 500,000 troops.51 He
knew the BEF had to be expanded, but having little faith in the
Territorial Force, he decided to form New Armies—new divisions of

Viscount Haldane speech to the House of Lords, 16 November 1915, Hansard Vol.
20, col. 371, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1915-11-16/debates/8f834b0b7a9f-4934-b56d-1f09afe1179d/TheHeadquartersStaffAtTheFront, accessed 8 April
2019.
50  
Clive Hughes, “The New Armies,” in Ian F.W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (eds.),
A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 100.
51  
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volunteers recruited for the duration of the war.52 In total, Kitchener
ordered the formation of five New Armies, which placed nearly 2.5
million Britons in uniform.53
To command and staff his New Army divisions, Kitchener
transferred regular officers, in particular pscs, who had been seconded
to the Territorial Force, to staff and train the New Armies.54 Some
officers serving in France, like Major-General Ivor Maxse, returned to
Britain to command and staff Kitchener’s new divisions.55 Invariably,
the New Army divisions had fewer pscs than the regular divisions.
The 12th (Eastern) Division was a bit of an exception in that it had a
higher proportion of regular officers than other New Army divisions,
largely due to Kitchener’s efforts to cancel leaves of Indian army officers
and recall recently-retired officers to active service. Major-General Sir
J.M. Babington, the GOC of the 23rd Division, was one such example
of the latter group.56 For the duration of the war, regular officers filled
the majority of the staff appointments in the New Army divisions.
Regular officers on the divisional staff typically held great sway with
their GOCs, who were always regular officers and distrustful of their
“amateur” subordinates.57 Staff-trained officers made the New Army
divisions run. They provided the necessary nuclei for divisions to
expand and learn how to fight on the Western Front.
By the time New Army divisions deployed to the continent, the
pool of staff-trained officers available for service on divisional staffs
had been depleted. Already a precious and scarce commodity, many
The amateur soldiers of the Territorial Force were not subject to involuntary
overseas service. The strength of the Territorial Force in July 1914 was 268,777
officers and men, of which only 18,683 had agreed to serve overseas in the event of
war. Beckett, “The Territorial Force,” in Beckett and Simpson (eds.), A Nation in
Arms, 130.
53  
Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, xiv.
54  
Beckett, “The Territorial Force,” 131. On the important role that British regular
army officers had throughout the war as both commanders and trainers, see Peter
E. Hodgkinson, British Infantry Battalion Commanders in the First World War
(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2015).
55  
Although the circumstances of Maxse’s reassignment suggest that Haig and FieldMarshal Sir John French, the C-in-C of the BEF, doubted Maxse’ command abilities,
Maxse later proved to be an excellent trainer and leader. Under his command,
the 18th (Eastern) Division became one of the best divisions in the BEF. Nikolas
Gardner, Trial by Fire: Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914
(Westport: Praeger, 2003), 96-98; Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front
1914-18, 87; and Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, 306, 317-318.
56  
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pscs had been killed commanding units or promoted to corps and
army staffs. In June 1915, when the 12th Division first went into the
line, psc-trained officers held only six of the fifteen key divisional
command and staff positions, a considerably lower proportion than
existed in the regular divisions.58 Although neither the GOC nor
his brigade commanders had completed any staff training, all of the
GSOs, AA & QMG, the BM RA, and one of the infantry brigade
BMs were psc-qualified. During the division’s first major action—the
largely disastrous Battle of Loos—the staff coordinated a relief of
the Guards Division and organized a stout defence against numerous
counterattacks.59 In follow-on operations, the 12th Division suffered
heavy casualties including its commander, Major-General F.D.V.
Wing, who was killed on 2 October.60 When the 15th (Scottish)
Division first went into the line in July 1915, psc-trained officers held
six of the fifteen key divisional command and staff positions.61 The
15th Division’s history notes, “At no time were there more than five
Regular officers in any one brigade, including the staff, the seniors
[officers] being retired Regulars, Militia officers, or Territorials.”62
The AA & QMG, Lieutenant-Colonel E.F. Taylor had completed the
administrative course offered at LSE, so the division had seven trained
staff officers in key appointments.63 In the 15th Division’s first major
action at Loos, it made the furthest advance of any British division in
a day’s battle between the outbreak of war and the Battle of Cambrai
(20 November-7 December 1917).64 However, without adequate and
responsive artillery support, or sufficient reserves, the division was

Arthur B. Scott and P. Middleton Brumwell, History of the 12th (Eastern)
Division in the Great War, 1914-1918 (London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1923), 238-49;
and War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-62.
59  
Scott and Brumwell, History of the 12th (Eastern) Division in the Great War,
1914-1918, 12-25.
60  
“Casualty Details: Wing, Frederick Drummond Vincent,” Commonwealth
War Graves Commission (CWGC), http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead/
casualty/466353/WING,%20FREDERICK%20DRUMMOND%20VINCENT,
accessed 18 December 2015; and Scott and Brumwell, History of the 12th (Eastern)
Division in the Great War, 15.
61  
J. Stewart and John Buchan, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 1914-1919
(London and Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1926), 294-300; and War
Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-62.
62  
Stewart and Buchan, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 3.
63  
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not able to exploit its initial successes.65 In September 1915, when the
23rd Division first went into the line near Armentières, psc-trained
officers only held four of the fifteen key divisional command and
staff positions.66 Similarly, in July 1916, when the 35th Division first
went into action during the Battle of the Somme, psc-trained officers
held five of the fifteen key divisional command and staff positions.67
Major-General R.J. Pinney, the GOC, was one of numerous regular
army officers brought back from France to fill key command and
staff appointments in the New Armies.68 In the New Army divisions,
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few pscs filled BM or second-tier staff positions. They simply were
not available.
Kitchener had few pscs to command his new divisions and serve
of their staffs. The lower proportion of staff-trained officers in New
Army divisions reflected two things—that they were formed after the
assembly of the regular divisions and that psc officers were scarce.
Kitchener tried to staff his division with experienced officers, but
the creation of the New Armies quickly drained the pool of available
pscs. The manpower requirements of the BEF and the imperative to
maintain the efficiency of the regular divisions limited the number
of staff-trained officers that Kitchener could repatriate from France.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Burnett-Stuart, the GSO 1 of 15th Division
(and future commandant of the staff school at Hesdin), for example,
understood the necessity of an effective staff. Like other regular
officers seconded to the New Army divisions—both staff-trained and
not—he mentored his subordinates and worked to build the “excellent
relations [that] existed between the Divisional staff and all other
headquarters in the division.”69 Working staffs were too important to
give up. The few pscs that did serve in New Army divisions generally
filled the most critical roles. Most importantly, they mentored their
inexperienced peers and subordinates and to make them proficient in
staff duties.
Generally, in the Territorial Force divisions, psc-qualified officers
only held the first-tier command and staff positions. The Territorial
divisions had to compete with New Army and Dominion divisions,
which were being formed at the same time, for the few trained staff
officers still available for service. Although distrusted by Kitchener,
the Territorial Force made up the majority of the infantry battalions
in the BEF. By 1918, 692 Territorial battalions had been raised,
versus 557 New Army and 267 regular battalions.70 In August 1914,
when the 47th (2nd London) Division mobilized for full-time service,
psc-trained officers only held five of fifteen key divisional command
and staff positions.71 The GOC, Major-General Sir Charles St. Leger
Barter understood that his staff and troops were inexperienced, and

Stewart and Buchan, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 60.
Beckett, “The Territorial Force,” 132.
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he requested that his division not be committed to battle during the
Second Battle of Ypres (22 April-25 May 1915), until it was properly
trained and ready.72 GHQ approved his request and sent the division
to the quieter Béthune sector, so that the troops could become more
familiarized with trench warfare and the staff proficient in their
duties.73 Major H.V. de la Fontaine had previously served in France
with the East Surrey Regiment before he was recalled to fill the AA
& QMG appointment.74 He was an excellent administrator and an
expert on administrative matters, no doubt due to the education he
received at Camberley. One officer remarked, “Many of us have often
had to consult [de la Fontaine] at divisional headquarters, where he
used to work till nearly midnight, behind a pile of cigarette ends,
and usually with an extinct cigar between his lips.”75 The state of
his divisional staff was not unique amongst early-forming territorial
divisions. In February 1916, when the 56th (1st London) Division
entered the frontlines around Hallencourt, psc-trained officers held
four of the fifteen key divisional command and staff positions.76
In the reinforcement Territorial divisions, staff-trained officers
similarly held only a third of the command and staff appointments.
In June 1916, when the 60th (2nd/2nd London) Division first went
into the line near Vimy Ridge, psc-trained officers held just four of
the key divisional command and staff positions.77 The GOC, MajorGeneral E.S. Bulfin, had qualified for staff employment due to his
service on staffs during the South African War, bringing the total to
five.78 Bulfin had commanded a brigade in 1914 and distinguished
himself during the fighting on the Aisne and near Ypres, before he was
brought back from France to take command of the division.79 When
the 62nd (2nd West Riding) Division first went into the line near the
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Ancre valley in January 1917, psc-trained officers held four of the
fifteen key divisional command and staff positions, while the DAA &
QMG, Major H.F. Lea, had qualified for staff employment as a result
of previous service.80 The GOC, Major-General W.P. Braithwaite, a
former Quetta commandant, had also served as the chief of staff for
the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) before dismissal from
the post.81 Fortunately for the division, he performed much better
as GOC than he did as chief of staff. Of note, only three Territorial
Force officers commanded divisions, and just three became GSO 1s
during the war.82 Like the New Army divisions, Territorial divisions
had considerably fewer pre-war staff-trained officers than the regular
divisions.

Everard Wyrall, The History of the 62nd (West Riding) Division, 1914-1919,
Volume I (London, Edinburgh and New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., 1921),
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Although they were few in number, these pscs proved their
worth. The Territorial divisions examined in this study had rough
introductions to battle. The 47th Division sustained high casualties
and failed to hold captured ground during the Battle of Festubert
(15-25 May 1915), and the 56th Division failed to secure the
Gommecourt salient on the first day of the Battle of the Somme.83
The staffs may have had a poor beginning, but they sent “lessons
learned” to corps and army headquarters, where staffs at these
headquarters distributed them around the entire BEF.84 This was
the sort of dynamic learning process that resulted in new tactics
and equipment, such as those espoused in SS143 Instructions of
the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, 1917 or Brooke’s
map-form orders for a rolling barrage.85 There were no easy battles
during the war, but these lessons that were learned on the battlefield,
and shared amongst staffs throughout the entire BEF, enabled it to
eventually defeat the German army on the battlefield.86 By filling
the first-tier command and staff appointments in the divisions, they
provided much needed competence and mentorship. Generally, the
later a division was formed, the fewer staff-trained officers it had.
Towards the end of the war, few pscs were still serving on divisional
staffs, those positions being mostly filled by graduates of the wartime
staff courses. Most pre-war graduates of Camberley and Quetta were
employed in corps and army headquarters by that time.
Like Britain, none of the Dominions were prepared to fight an
industrial war in 1914. In Canada, the militia was an amateurish
force, and its officers lacked the necessary command experience and
staff knowledge to plan and direct large formations. The twelve psctrained officers that Canada had available were insufficient to fill
all the required staff positions in the rapidly-expanding Canadian
Expeditionary Force (CEF).87 Fortunately, pre-war efforts to
83  
Maude, The History of the 47th (London) Division, 11-24; and Dudley Ward, The
56th Division (1st London Territorial Division), 11-48.
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and London: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 67-68.
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On the platoon tactics promulgated in SS 143, see Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics
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Yale University Press, 2000), 194. Brooke, “Notes on my life,” 1954 Alanbrooke
Papers, 5/2/13, LHCMA, King’s College London, 52-53.
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standardize organizational structure and staff training enabled
Dominion formations to be plugged into the BEF with only minor
reorganization and training. Still, Canadian efforts to field divisions
were as anything but smooth, mostly because of the actions of Sam
Hughes, the minister of militia and defence.88 Hughes threw out
existing expeditionary force plans and improvised the mobilization
of the CEF with his own erratic methods, so that he could fill the
senior ranks of the division with his political cronies—not exactly a
recipe for success.
The other Dominions also began to form new formations from
their own volunteer forces for overseas service. In August 1914, the
Australians offered Britain an expeditionary force of 20,000 men,
organized into an infantry division and a light horse brigade.89
Originally destined for England for further training, elements of
the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) were diverted to Egypt on 3
February 1915, to counter a Turkish attack against the Suez Canal.90
Once complete in Egypt, the 1st Australian Division received orders
to prepare for the assault against the Dardanelles in April 1915.91 In
August 1914, the New Zealand government had offered to raise two
brigades but, by 1916, it increasingly pressured the War Office to
allow the Dominion to form its own division, and the War Office, after
consultation with the Australian government, agreed in March 1916.92
Early-forming Dominion divisions generally had higher numbers
of pscs in key appointments. This initially had less to do with the
number of staff-trained officers that the Dominions had available
than it did with the relatively large numbers of imperial pscs the
War Office was willing to lend. The British army initially seconded
For an assessment of Hughes, see Ronald G. Haycock, Sam Hughes: The Public
Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916 (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier
University Press, 1986). 177-312; and Tim Cook, The Madman and the Butcher:
The Sensational Wars of Sam Hughes and General Arthur Currie (Toronto: Penguin
Canada, 2010), 57-71, 98-130.
89  
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Canada, and New Zealand and those in East Africa (Newport: Ray Westlake, 1992),
14.
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163-64.
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Official Records (Auckland, Christchurch, Dunedin and Wellington: Whitecombe
and Tombs Limited, 1921), 5-6.
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Major-General A.C. Macdonnell and Staff, 1st Canadian Infantry Division. [Library and
Archives Canada PA-002620]

some of its best officers to fill command and staff appointments in
the Dominion divisional headquarters, where they also mentored
Dominion officers. As the Australian official history outlined when
units first arrived in France in 1916:
It was unavoidable that a number of the higher staff officers, especially
of the general staff, should be borrowed from the British, the trained
Australian staff being very small and the number of officers to whom
the actual planning of operations could be safely entrusted being still
few.93

In April 1915, when the 1st Canadian Division first went into action
during the Second Battle of Ypres, psc-trained officers held ten of the

C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918: Volume
III—The Australian Imperial Force in France 1916 (Sydney: Angus and Robertson,
1941), 46.
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fifteen key divisional command and staff positions.94 Five of these pscs
were experienced British officers—Major-General E.A.H. Alderson,
Colonel C.F. Romer, Colonel T.B. Wood, Major G.C.W. GordonHall, and Major R.J.F. Hayter—who all filled first-tier positions
on the staff.95 They increased the effectiveness of the division and
mentored the junior staff officers in the performance of their staff
duties. It is worth noting that Brigadier-General M.S. Mercer, the
A. Fortescue Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War,
1914-1915: Chronology, Appendices and Maps (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1938), 42830; Kenneth Radley, We Lead Others Follow: First Canadian Division, 1914-1918
(St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2006), 382-84; and War Office, The
Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-62.
95  
Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid to C.G.S., “List of British Officers Who Served with
Canadian Troops in the Field,” 5 October 1927, RG 24, Vol. 447, HQ 54-21-1-203,
Library and Archives Canada (LAC); and “Command and Staff Appointments in
the CEF and OMFC [Overseas Military Forces of Canada],” n.d., RG 150, Vol. 473,
LAC.
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commander of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General
A.W. Currie, commander of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade,
and Lieutenant-Colonel G.B. Hughes, BM of the 3rd Canadian
Infantry Brigade, had all completed the militia staff course (MSC)
before the war.96 In total, trained staff officers held thirteen of the
fifteen key appointments. The number of pscs holding command and
staff appointments in the division was as high as the formed regular
divisions, and certainly better than most New Army and Territorial
Force divisions that formed around the same time.
Many of the psc-qualified officers serving on the 1st Canadian
Division staff in April 1915, including imperial officers, had served
in Canada and held staff appointments at some point before the war.
For instance, Alderson had served in Nova Scotia for two years as a
junior officer and had two Canadian battalions under his command
during the South African War.97 Gordon-Hall was serving on the
Canadian general staff as the director of operations and staff duties.98
He joined the CEF immediately when the war began. Hayter, a
Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) graduate who had taken
an imperial commission, was also serving in Canada and joined the
CEF when the war began.99 Before the war, Brigadier-General H.E.
Burstall served as commandant of the Canadian Royal School of
Artillery, making him an ideal candidate for CRA.100 Major A.H.
Macdonell, the GSO 2, had graduated from Camberley in 1906 and
was serving as the assistant adjutant general for administration, 1st
Divisional Area in Canada in August 1914.101 Wood, another imperial
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officer, had served in Canada for four years before the war in a
variety of appointments, including commandant of RMC.102
When the 1st Australian Division landed at Anzac Beach on 25
April 1915, staff-trained officers filled six of the fifteen key divisional
command and staff appointments.103 Although the division had
fewer pscs than the British regular divisions and the 1st Canadian
Divisions, it had more staff-trained officers in its headquarters than
the Territorial Force divisions and other late-forming Dominion
divisions. The pscs who served on the divisional staff during the
Gallipoli campaign (17 February 1915-9 January 1916) subsequently
played an important role in the expansion of the AIF. After the
division withdrew from Gallipoli in December, its officers, in particular
the pscs, were central in the “doubling” process that grew the AIF
from two infantry divisions to five. For example, Majors T.A. Blamey
and J. Gellibrand, from the 1st Australian Division, went to the
2nd Australian Division Headquarters in July 1915.104 Furthermore,
a number of British officers, most of whom had been serving with the
Australian army before the war began, also served on various AIF
staffs and held command appointments.105 These included Major D.J.
Glasfurd, GSO 2, Major S.M. Anderson, BM RA, Brigadier-General
E.G. Sinclair-MacLagan, commander of the 3rd Australian Infantry
Brigade, and Captain F.D. Irvine, BM of the 1st Australian Infantry
Brigade.106
In September 1915, when the 2nd Canadian Division arrived in
France, psc-trained officers held only four of the fifteen key divisional
command and staff positions, a sign that staff-trained officers in the

102  
Thomas Birchall Wood Personnel File, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box
10542-27, LAC; “Notes on British Officers Who Served with CEF,” n.d., RG 24,
Vol. 1764, LAC.
103  
Australian Imperial Force, Staff Regimental and Gradation List of Officers, 22nd
September 1914 (Melbourne: Government Printer, 1914), 5, 10-13, 17, 21; and War
Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-62.
104  
Robert C. Stevenson, To Win the Battle: The 1st Australian Division in the Great
War, 1914-18 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 5.
105  
Australian Military Forces, Officers’ List of the Australian Military Forces, 1
August 1914 (Melbourne: Government Printer, 1914), 7-17, 20, 26, 31, 33, 35, 38-40.
106  
Ibid., 22, 34, 201; and Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of
1914–1918: Volume I, 50-51.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/2

26

Hogan: Nervous System Architecture
HOGAN

27

CEF were already scarce by the spring of 1915.107 Three of these were
experienced imperial officers: Colonel H.D. de Prée, GSO 1, Major
C.A. Ker, GSO 2, and Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Stewart, BM of the
4th Canadian Infantry Brigade.108 Brigadier-General L.G.F.M. Lord
Brooke, although not psc-qualified, commanded the 4th Brigade.109
Sam Hughes criticized the decision to appoint British officers to
the senior staff positions instead of Canadians, and he arrogantly
remarked that “the men who fought well at St. Julien and Festubert
require no staff college theorists to direct them.”110 However, these
British officers provided Canadian commanders and staff officers
with rudimentary command and staff training, since many of the
Canadian officers lacked both field command experience and staff
training. The arrival of the 2nd Canadian Division in France and
the subsequent formation of Canadian Corps only exacerbated the
shortage of trained staff officers.
Amongst the Dominion divisions formed later in the war,
the percentage of trained staff officers filling command and staff
appointments on a divisional staff tended to be quite low. In April
1916, when the New Zealand Division left Egypt to fight in France,
psc-trained officers only held two of the fifteen key divisional
command and staff positions, and Lieutenant-Colonel H.G. Reid,
the AA & QMG, had completed the administrative course offered
at LSE.111 In total, staff-trained officers held three of the fifteen
key appointments. Although the GOC and most of his subordinate
commanders and staff had not completed any staff training, the GSO
1 and the AA & QMG, both first-tier staff positions, continued to be
held by staff-trained officers, which provided the necessary nervous
system nodes for the division to learn how to fight on the Western
Front. During the disastrous attack at Fromelles (19-20 July 1916),
only one psc-trained officer held a staff appointment in the 5th
107  
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Australian Division.112 For the Canadians, many of the pscs that
served in Canadian divisions had been promoted to staff appointments
in the Canadian Corps headquarters. For the Australians and New
Zealanders, many of their staff-trained officers had moved up to the
I and II ANZAC Corps headquarters or served on staffs of divisions
that formed earlier in the war.
Although capable of planning and directing the operations that
established the reputations of the Dominion corps as shock troops in
the latter half of the war, the staffs of Dominion divisions, like their
British counterparts, experienced growing pains before they became
proficient. Shortly after the 1st Canadian Division moved into the
Ypres salient in April 1915, it defended the city following a German

112  
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gas attack and held the frontline.113 Many of the staff officers exercised
great initiative, often making up for their commanders’ mistakes.
After Currie left his headquarters to fetch reinforcements for his
2nd Brigade, Kemmis-Betty effectively assumed command of the
brigade and directed its defence of Gravenstafel Ridge.114 Similarly,
after the divisional headquarters lost contact with the 2nd and 3rd
Brigades, Gordon-Hall went forward, conducted an appreciation of
the situation, formulated a plan, and issued orders to the brigade
commanders to close the gaps between their brigades.115
The 1st Australian Division also underwent a miserable baptism
of fire at Gallipoli in April 1915. Inexperienced and unfit officers
riddled the divisional staff, and they failed at planning and managing
the complexities of an amphibious operation.116 Shortages of weapons
and ammunition compounded these failures in command and staff
procedures.117 Despite these shortcomings, the staff, after some
personnel changes, did effectively plan and manage the evacuation
of the division from Gallipoli. General Sir John Monash, later the
commander of the Australian Corps, praised the evacuation: “It
was a most brilliant conception, brilliantly organized, and brilliantly
executed.”118 The Dominion staffs were learning and improving.
The late-forming Dominion divisions fought in their first
engagements with mixed results. The 2nd Canadian Division did
not fare as well in its first combat action during the Battle of the St.
Eloi Craters (27 March-16 April 1916). The division failed to hold
the craters, the troops suffered horribly throughout the action, and
Major-General Richard Turner and his staff, which included a pscqualified imperial officer as GSO 1, did little to restore command and
control amidst the chaos of the battle.119 Not all Camberley graduates
were competent. The New Zealand Division first went into action
during the Battle of Flers-Courcelette (15-22 September 1916) and
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did quite well.120 The staff planned a barrage that silenced most of
the German guns and knocked out many of the German machine
guns, which allowed the infantry to advance and secure the village
of Flers.121 The 5th Australian Division first went into action during
the attack at Fromelles, which was a diversionary action during the
Somme offensive. The attack failed, and the division sustained over
5,500 casualties.122 Although the Australian Official History and the
5th Australian Division’s historian, both adherents of the “Digger”
myth, have laid much of the blame upon Lieutenant-General
Richard Haking, IX Corps commander, and his staff, the divisional
commander, Major-General J.W. McCay, must also shoulder some
of the blame.123 A militia general and a former minister of defence,
McCay neither ordered his division to consolidate its initial gains nor
ensured that his staff adequately planned the operation.124
Still, staff-trained officers were a valuable commodity in the
BEF, and after their initial engagements with their divisions, many
of them went on to hold important command and staff positions.
While some may have failed in certain appointments, the War
Office almost always found some way to use the administrative and
technical knowledge that they had learned at the staff colleges. For
instance, the British official historian of the Great War, BrigadierGeneral Sir James Edmonds began the war as the GSO 1 of the 4th
Division. However, he broke down under the strain of his duties and
had to be replaced shortly after hostilities commenced.125 Others were
more successful. Brigadier-General R.J. Pinney, the commander of
the 23rd Infantry Brigade, was promoted to major-general and given
command of the 35th Division.126 Captain J.G. Dill, the BM of the
25th Infantry Brigade, eventually became a field-marshal and served
as Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the beginning of the Second
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Two Canadian staff officers. May, 1917. [Library and Archives Canada PA-001293]

World War.127 Lieutenant-Colonel J. Burnett-Stuart also went on to
have an exemplary military career. He performed quite well as the
GSO 1 of the 15th Division and, in December 1915, GHQ selected
him to open a small wartime staff college at Hesdin in France in an
effort to redress the shortage of trained staff officers.128 This began
the process of standardized wartime staff training for the BEF.
Captain H.F. Baillie, the GSO 3, moved up into a GSO 2 position in
III Corps before returning to the division as GSO 1 in May 1917.129
Many of the officers the British army seconded to the Canadian
Corps and the few Canadian pscs also went on to have distinguished
military careers. After serving as GSO 1 of the 1st Canadian Division,
Cecil Romer went on to command the 59th (2nd North Midland)
Division towards the end of the war and became the adjutant general
for the forces in the interwar years.130 After G.C.W. Gordon-Hall’s
tenure as GSO 2 of the 1st Canadian Division, he served as GSO 2 of
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the Canadian Corps, from January until May 1916.131 R.J.F. Hayter
rose from major to brigadier-general.132 Before he became BGGS in
October 1918, he had served as GSO 2 of the 2nd Canadian Division,
GSO 1 of the 3rd and 1st Canadian Divisions, and commanded the
10th Canadian Infantry Brigade, the last British officer to command
a brigade in the Canadian Corps. After Harry Burstall’s tenure as
CRA, he was promoted to major-general and appointed GOC of the
Royal Canadian Artillery from 1915 until 1916, when he became the
GOC of the 2nd Canadian Division, which he commanded until the
end of the war.133 A.H. Macdonell rose quickly through the ranks and
commanded the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade from March 1916
until July 1917.134
This study indicates that staff-trained officers were critical in the
growth and the battlefield performance of the British Empire armies of
the First World War. They occupied most of the key command and staff
positions in the divisions when the formations were formed and first went
into action. Generally, pscs held all of the key command and staff positions
in regular and early-forming Dominion divisions, the latter of which were
fortunate in that they simply held on to their on-loan imperial officers,
many of whom were psc, to supplement their early contingents.135 Since
the pool of staff-trained officers had been drained by the time the New
Army, Territorial, and later Dominion divisions formed, they only held
the first-tier appointments on the divisional staffs for those late-forming
formations. Throughout the war, pscs were always the first appointed to
first-tier positions in new divisions, sometimes even before the GOC had
been identified. They were also critical in generating new staff officers for
the nervous system architecture. They established and ran the wartime
staff courses, and they mentored officers of identified talent through the
staff learner system. By the end of the war, few pscs remained in divisional
headquarters. Most of them had moved ‘up’ by that time—way up the
131  
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chain of command—to command and staff appointments in corps and
army headquarters.
This examination also finds that, with the exception of the GOC and
GSO 1 appointments, fewer psc-trained officers held command and staff
appointments during the formation of Territorial Force, New Army, and
late-forming Dominion divisions. By the time these divisions formed
and first went into action, the pool of staff-trained officers available for
service on a divisional staff had been largely depleted. Already a precious
and scarce commodity, many pscs had been killed commanding units or
promoted to corps and army staffs as the BEF continued to expand. In some
instances, pscs serving in France or Belgium returned to England to help
form these new divisions, and they continued to serve on the divisional
staffs throughout the formation’s training, familiarization period, and first
major action. On average, from the New Army and Territorial divisions
examined, trained staff officers held five of the fifteen key divisional
command and staff positions, while the late-forming Dominion divisions
had three pscs employed in these roles.
Finally, this inquiry finds that the importance of trained staff
officers and the role they played in the building of the BEF cannot
be overstated. More work, however, still needs to be done in order
to gain a more definitive understanding of the role played by stafftrained officers who had gained their qualifications before the end of
1914. This article surveyed approximately 30 per cent of the divisions
in the BEF in 1918, and it only accounted for their formation and first
major action. An examination of all of the divisions in the BEF and
other expeditionary forces, from their formation until the armistice in
November 1918, is warranted to determine how staff-trained officers
were employed in the larger imperial army. For most of the war, psctrained officers held the majority of the first-tier divisional command
and staff appointments. By holding these critical appointments, these
officers were the very architecture of the staff nervous system, which
allowed the BEF to expand from a small six-division force in 1914
to a highly-effective sixty-division imperial army by 1918. They
commanded the battalions, brigades, divisions, corps, and armies,
and they planned and directed the operations of the BEF during
a four-year slugging match with the German army on the Western
Front. Towards the end of the war, officers trained through the staff
learner programme or the wartime staff colleges replaced the pscs,
but they had been trained by pscs, like Burnett-Stuart. By filling
the divisional staff appointments, they freed up pscs for service on
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corps and army headquarters. Serving in these headquarters in the
later years of the war, pscs played an instrumental role in directing
the high-tempo, successful operations of the BEF during the Hundred
Days offensive of 1918.
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